Suffolk Probate and Family Court, 24 New Chardon Street, Boston Massachusetts
02114
Case No. 07e0072
DAVID E. ROBINSON, et al, pro se______________________ Plaintiff v. CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, et al______ Defendants
Exhibit BBB Maryfrances Cassell vs. Christian Science Board of Directors
From Appeal Transcript Case No. 2006-P-0285
[Miss. Cassell, after preliminaries]
1. The issue being whether or not
I have standing to bring this case under the trust and the law, the Probate Court
has decided, based on prior case law, that the trust at issue here is a public charitable
trust and therefore that only the Attorney General has standing to enforce the trust.
2.
I submit, First. That the prior case law was wrongly decided, and that the case at
issue is a private trust based on the clear intent of the Grantor of the trust expressed
in the trust document, in her Will, and in her communications and writings.
3.
Second. Should the court continue to apply the improper case law and deem this an
issue of a public trust, I submit that I have standing as a private individual whose
claim is distinct from that of the general public.
4. Finally. I submit to
the court the Probate Court.s duty, as a simple matter of justice, to examine and
correct a condition where there is ample evidence that the clear intent of the Grantor
is being frustrated by Trustees who have abandoned their expressed trust.
5.
The prior case law relied upon by the Probate Court has been deliberately misrepresented
as an hierarchy to the courts.
6. In 1892 Mary Baker Eddy reorganized her
church through a legal deed of trust for the exclusive purpose of attaining and maintaining
private control of the organization and removing it from any control by the Attorney
General.
7. Through this deed of trust, successor deeds, and her last Will
and Testament, Mrs. Eddy set up a privately governed voluntary association known
as Mary Baker Eddy.s Church, The Mother Church, or The First Church of Christ, Scientist,
in Boston, Massachusetts, which she gave in trust to all 88 of the members of her
church as named grantees.
8. She vested the grant by naming four members of
the church, in her deed of trust, as grantees with benefits flowing to their successors,
the future members of the church under a private trust, totally independent from
control by the State or the Attorney General.
9. Mrs. Eddy further included
in her deed the church Manual, that is, the document, an administrative document
containing permanent governing by-laws to permit this private voluntary association
to be governed as a body corporate and not as a public charity, including in the
by-laws the checks and balances that would cause the membership to govern the church
in keeping with her intent, and to guard the organization from hierarchical control
by internal officials. Thus Mrs. Eddy re-established her church in 1892 as a unique
private trust for all time.
10. It is axiomatic that the intent of the grantor
of a deed of trust is paramount, and should be enforced in so far as it is not impermissible
under other law, or overwhelmingly against the public interest.
11. In this
case, Mrs. Eddy as Grantor has designated in her deed the specific [1892] law in
the Statutes of Massachusetts under which her deeds should be enforced, a designation
that puts enforcement of her deeds squarely in the jurisdiction of the Probate Court
as a unique private trust.
12. To apply the cited prior case law and declare
Mrs. Eddy.s Church to be a public trust in direct violation of her clearly expressed
wishes as a Grantor, violates fundamental principles of private contract.
13.
Further. To remove from the members the rights and obligations of self government
that the Grantor installed in the trust and to turn enforcement instead over to the
State and the office of the Attorney General is to violate the clear intent of her
grant.
14. Opposing counsel argues that the members of Mrs. Eddy.s church
have no voting power and that the trust establishing her church is therefore a public
trust. This narrow reading . . . can you hear me? . . . this narrow reading of the
trust does not acknowledge the Grantor.s expressed position in the bylaws bestowing
on each member of her church the duty to ensure enforcement of the manual and its
bylaws and the deeds of trust, a duty that is far greater than any single vote would
be.
15. I quote from the church manual, page 28, line 25, .It is the duty
of any member of this church, to inform the Board of Directors of the failure, of
any, officer in this church to perform his official duties..
16. Respondents
are presently officers governed by this by-law. Their official duties are laid out
in the church manual and in the deeds of trust, and they are in direct violation
of these express duties.
17. The Petitioner is a member of this Church, a
named grantee of the deeds, as a successor to the originally named grantees, and
contractually obligated under the quoted by-law to see that the Grantor's intent
as expressed in the deeds be fulfilled, thus the documents by which Mrs. Eddy reorganized
her Church clearly state her intent that it be a private trust enforced by the Probate
Court and that the grantees, the contractual members of her Church, have the right
and obligation to see her intent fulfilled.
18. This clearly gives the Petitioner
the standing to bring this Petition.
19. If this court continues, in spite
of the clear will of the Grantor, to deem this an issue of public trust, the Petitioner
respectfully submits that she nonetheless has standing as a private citizen whose
personal interests are directly impacted by the current violations of the trust.
20.
The Probate Court erroneously stated that the petitioner, quote, .makes no argument
that her claim is distinct from the general public.. That is the stated judgement
of the Probate Court.
21. As stated before, the Petitioner as a member of
Mrs. Eddy.s organization, has been granted certain rights and duties under Mrs. Eddy.s
organ... under Mrs. Eddy.s deeds and the by-laws of the church.
22. Any erroneous
decision that the church is a public charity strips the Petitioner of the rights
so granted, interferes with her ability to fulfill her assigned duties, puts her
in violation of her own contractual obligation as a member of the church.
23.
Furthermore, the decision circumvents the intents of the Grantor of the church of
which the Petitioner is a main member, threatening to change the entire character
and nature of the church thus depriving the petitioner of her most valuable and renown
possession.
24. It seems very clear that as a member of this church entrusted
with duties and imbued with rights the Petitioner holds a claim notably distinct
from and more personally valuable than that of the general public.
25. The Grantor provides an integral check in the office of the Clerk to enforce
proper conduct of the respondents but the respondents, but the respondents have rendered
the office of the Clerk inoperative, abolishing the crucial check for the members,
making it impossible for the members, of which the Petitioner is one, to fulfill
their duty to enforce the trust, thus the members must appeal to the Probate Court
to enforce the Grantors expressed trust.
26. It should be noted further that
the present Officials have deliberately abolished all checks and balances as part
of an attempt to instill and exercise hierarchical control that is the antithesis
of the Grantor's clear intent for her church. Mrs. Eddy designed her church to have
no clergy whosoever with all members named as equal grantees under the trust and
in the church documents, it is not a Hierarchy.
27. The office of the Board
of Directors contrary to the actions of the respondents was designed to be similar
to that of a deacon, merely functional in nature and solely governed through the
church Manual.
28. The Respondents have abandoned their duty to administer
the trust in keeping with the Grantor.s overall intent. Therefore the Petitioner
request this honorable Appeals Court to remand the petition to the Probate Court
for consideration of Petitioner.s claim and that the present Officials should resign
their respective offices forthwith, and let the vacancies be filled as provided by
the church Manual in Article 1, Section 9, page 28, with proper officers who will
follow the clear intent of the Grantor and enforce the express trust which all members
as grantees have contracted to obey.
29. Petitioner further requests that
this honorable Court order a writ of certiorari, or review of the case law improperly
quoting that Mrs. Eddy.s Church is a public charitable trust rather than a unique
private trust, the sole government document of which is its church Manual, enforceable
by the Probate Court in keeping with the designated intent of the Grantor, Mary Baker
Eddy.
30. Thank you.
[end of Miss. Cassell.s presentation]
[Perretta]
Thank you. I must say, that was a very clear articulation of your position!
Now
we will hear from, the Church.
[Mr. Dinsmoor.s presentation, below]
31.
May it please the Court, I'm Ted Dinsmoor, and I am Counsel to the Appelees, the
Christian Science Board of Directors.
32. The Supreme Judicial Court has on
at least three prior occasions reviewed Mrs. Eddy's 1892 deed of trust and the various
quit claim deeds and indentures that she authored and executed in 1904 and 1906 which
effectively modified or amend the 1892 deed of trust.
33. In all three occasions
in initially the case of Case v. Dickey, then in the case of Crout Hall v. Attorney
General, both decided back in the 1918-1920 period, and then more recently in the
case of Weaver v. Wood, the SJC has held that the 1892 deed of trust creates a public
charitable trust.
34. And it would appear that the argument that is being
made on appeal here is simply that the SJC was wrong in its legal conclusions.
[Perretta]
Or it may be time for them to change their mind . . .
[Dinsmoor] I beg your
pardon?
[Perretta] Or it may be time for them to change their mind . . .
[Dinsmoor]
Well, it would, that.s always a possibility and the court can at sometime change
. . .
[Perretta] We know that . . .
[embarrassed laughter; humor, smiles]
[Dinsmoor]
But, but certainly in that context it would be, appear that the proceeding here is
merely a step to getting to the SJC to see . . .
[Perretta] . . . it happens
all the time.
[Dinsmoor] . . . regarding its prior ruling.
[one other
Justices] Could I ask you this?
[Dinsmoor] Yes.
[Justice] What precisely did the directors do that has
precipitated this lawsuit?
[Dinsmoor] I'm not sure that the Directors did
anything as far as I can find in the record. What occurred is that the President
of The Mother Church who serves on an annual basis, and there's a new president every
year, organized what has been termed a so-called .Peace Event. at The Mother Church
in conjunction with a local group of residents in the South End of Massachusetts
and this "Peace Event" was held to promote the Christian concept of "Brotherhood
Among Men."
35. And that according to the Plaintiff here, Miss Cassell,
the "Peace Event" violates the terms of Mrs. Eddy's 1892 deed of trust
which at least in part provides that the Board of Directors shall not allow or permit,
in said church building, any preaching or other religious services which shall not
be consonant and in strict harmony with the doctrines and practice of Christian Science
as taught and explained by Mary Baker G. Eddy.
36. The President having authorized
this "Peace Event," the "Peace Event" having occurred, Miss Cassell
has complained that the President somehow violated the deed of trust and therefore
she has brought her suit against the Board of Directors.
[Justice] The allegation
I take it, it constitutes teachings inconsistent with the doctrines of Christian
Science . . .
[Dinsmoor] That is the allegation.
[Justice] . . . and
it's taking place on church property. That is the allegation and complaint?
[Dinsmoor]
Yes.
[Justice] OK.
[Dinsmoor] And let me say though that any... although
I believe the law clearly articulated by the SJC it is very clear that this is a
public charitable trust, and therefore Miss. Cassell does not have standing to make
this claim.
[Perretta] To whom can she . . .
[Dismore] Our position
is that the very complaint itself as an alternative ground, that in the opinion below,
that any adjudication of this particular claim would violate the First Amendment.
[Justice]
Judge Smoot did not reach that . . .
[Perretta] . . . that issue?
[Dinsmoor]
He did not. It was argued below, and he did not. It was definitely argued and presented.
[Justice]
But he didn.t address it?
[Dinsmoor] He did not address it . . .
[Justice]
OK.
[Dinsmoor] . . . he did not. But it was certainly presented to him and
we submit that for this Court or the Probate Court or any court to delve into whether
or not a particular "Peace Even" at the church promoting the Christian
concept of Brotherhood is consonant, or inconsonant with the doctrines of Christian
Science as taught by Mary Baker Eddy.
[Perretta] So your saying that even
. . . so can I infer that your saying that even if she brought her complaint to the
Attorney General and asked him to uphold the public trust even that lawsuit would
have to fail, if brought before the Attorney General?
[Dinsmoor] The Attorney
General lawsuit would fail under the First Amendment, it would not under standing.
[Perretta]
No, no. That's what I understand your argument . . .
[Dinsmoor] But it certainly
. . .
[Perretta] So what you're saying is that she has absolutely nobody to
whom she can bring her complaint . . .
[Dinsmoor] Well as a matter of fact
. . .
[Perretta] . . . but the Board?
[Dinsmoor] Well as a matter of
law, No. She has no standing to pursue the complaint on her own.
Perretta]
Then we... And we have no authority to look into it?
[Dinsmoor] 37. Absolutely No. I would point out for the court's benefit that
Justice Flannery, that's on the (?) court, when he was in the Mass. trial court many
years ago, I actually argued the initial motion to dismiss the claims brought by
Weaver against Wood for Justice Flannery, and he issued his opinion on the motion
to dismiss in the trial court which has been reported at 2 Mass. Law Reporter 522
and without delving into all of the issues that we raised at that time, I did make
the First Amendment argument, in part, on the claim that was asserted, that was asserted
by Weaver that the Christian Science Board of Directors had violated a provision
of the Manual, the bylaws of The Mother Church, which provided in effect that they
had to that required that the Board of Directors exercise wisdom, economy and brotherly
love in their proceedings and Justice Flannery ruled that certainly with regard to
that particular claim the court was barred by the First Amendment from adjudicating
whether or not the Board exercised brotherly love because that again would intrude
into the realm of religious doctrine.
38. So it seems to me that at least
as you know, an articulation of the issues that we.ve got here that I think Justice
Flannery addressed it quit succinctly, in the trial court that was trying to determine
whether or not a "Peace Event" promoting brotherly love is consonant or
inconsonant with the doctrine of Christian Science, as Miss. Cassell would like to
have this court review, would be beyond the jurisdiction of this particular court.
39.
And if I may revert back to the deed of trust, just for moment, there are a couple
of things I would highlight for this court.
40. And that is that the essence
of Miss. Cassell.s argument seems to be that the 1892 deed of trust -- I'm going
beyond the precedence set by the SJC -- but it seems to be that her argument is that
this deed of trust creates some sort of, what I would call a private chapel, rather
than a public church.
41. And I would submit that any clear reading of the
deed of trust itself would indicate that Mrs. Eddy did not intend a private chapel,
the words of the deed of trust are quite clear in saying that the Board of Directors,
shall cause, to be built on the lot of land she granted a suitable and convenient
church edifice and that in the church edifice they, the Board of Directors shall
maintain, quote, "public worship in accordance with the doctrines of Christian
Science."
42. Public worship is public worship . . It's not a private
chapel.
43. I would also point out that in this same deed of trust, the same
paragraph, it says that for the purposes of executing their responsibility to maintain
public worship the Board of Directors, and again I.m quoting, "are fully empowered
to make any and all necessary rules and regulations." In other words it's within
the... under the deed of trust it is within the power and discretion of the Board
of Directors to make rules and regulations regarding what is appropriate and necessary
with regard to the services and other activities in the Mother Church.
44.
So I think if you look at the deed of trust itself it.s very clear that what was
intended here was a public charitable trust, a public church, not a private chapel
and that the Board is empowered to make such rules and regulations as appropriate.
45.
I would also point to the two amendatory documents, the quit claim deed and the indenture
which I think clearly evidences Mrs. Eddy.s intent that this be a public charitable
trust because in the 1904 quit claim deed she released all reverters to her heirs,
as in the 1906 indenture she release all reverters to herself, and, in effect said
that the conditions set forth with regard to the Board of directors. activities should
not be construed technically and should in no way be construed in such a way as to
cause any failure of trust itself, so I think Mrs. Eddy clearly recognized that she
was creating a public charitable trust and that is evident in the very documents
which she executed.
46. So with that, I think you know, that we would stand
on our brief. And unless there are any further questions of the court, that would
be the argument.
[end of Dinsmoor's presentation]
[Perretta] Thank
you.
[Dinsmoor] Thank you very much.
[Perretta] Miss. Cassell?
The
court is now going to take this matter under advisement, which means that we will
think about it. We're entitled to at least 130 days to do that after which a decision
will be made. In the interim now, I knowthat you had several requests to have these
proceedings transcribed, the court reporter to be here, and I denied those motions
because we don't have any official court reporter or one who we could swear in. However,
as we did advise you, the proceedings were recorded so that you can obtain a cassette
of the recording from the Clerk.s office. OK?
[Cassell] [quiet comment not heard]
[Perretta] Could you step over to
the microphone please? . . . take your time.
[Cassell] There is large group
in the Church that did file an Amicus Brief, but I understand, because I have a copy
of that, but I understand that it was . . .
[Perretta] You cannot, under the
rules of the court file an Amicus Brief without the permission of the court.
[Cassell]
They denied that . . .
[Perretta] That's why we don't have it.
[Cassell]
I just wanted you to know that there are many people in the Church who are quite
concerned with the hierarchy.
[Perretta] No... I understand that. That's why
I wanted to bring to your attention that there is a disc of this argument, both sides,
our remarks, which you can obtain from the clerk's office.
[Cassell] I appreciate
your explanation.
PUBLISHER'S NOTE: A copy of this disc will be made available
to the Probate Court upon request
CSCourtCase.info, 96 Maine Street #108, Brunswick, Maine 04011