Will this second litigation against the authority of the Directors end in the
same Fiasco as the first?
In the first instance, the Master rendered a decision
in favor of the Trustees and against the Board of Directors on a trial of the legal
facts involved.
When the lawyers for the Board of Directors heard of the
Master’s decision, they had the friends of the Board of Directors call a mass meeting
of the branches and told them the decision of the Master and advised the branches
to immediately boycott the literature — including Mrs. Eddy’s writings which the
trustees alone published — since the Board of Directors was under an injunction not
to interfere with the Trustees in their prosecution of the case.
The branches
immediately boycotted the literature and sent a bulletin to all the branches in the
Field telling them of the decision and advising them to do likewise, so when the
three judges of the Supreme Judicial Court made their decision, the field was told
that they decided the case on the influence their decision would have upon the Cause
and not on the merits of the case as found by the Master’s report. But this highly
broadcast claim is not true.
“The conclusion (of the Massachusetts, Supreme
Judicial Court) that the power of removal of a trustee is now vested in the (ecclesiastical)
Board of Directors is contrary to that of the Master, but it is in substance and
effect the application of different legal principles to the facts found by the Master.
The facts found by him are accepted in their entirety. The result which has been
stated follows in law from those facts.”
“The result is that the exceptions*
of the Defendants’ (the Board of Directors) to the Master’s report . . . so far as
they relate to his (the Master’s) ruling, that the Directors had no power under the
Deed of January 25, 1891, to remove a trustee and that the removal of Mr. Rowlands
was ineffectual, . . . are sustained.”
“Bill dismissed, November 23, 1921.”
*The
exceptions that the court must sustain the decisions of the ruling body of a religious
institution according to the First Article in Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
In the present courtcase, the Court is not being asked
to rule on any ecclesiastical "decisions of the ruling body of a religious institution"
(meaning the Mother Church); it is being asked to rule on the validity of the Complaint
according to the civilly recorded, foundational Deeds of Trust; it is a wholly non-religious,
secular Complaint.