NOTE: [January 24, 2009] I just received written notice from the Appeals Court for the “Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at Boston, in the case of 08-P-583, DAVID E. ROBINSON VS. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE BOARD OF DIRECTORS pending in the Probate and Family Court for the County of Suffolk: Ordered, that the following entry be made in the docket - Judgment affirmed. By the Court. [Ashley Ahearn], Clerk. Date January 14, 2009. NOTE The original of the within rescript will issue in due course, pursuant to M. R. A. P. 23.

The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Probate and Family Court, apparently pursuant to G. L. c. 249, § 6, seeking (inter alia) removal of the defendant directors of the First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston (Church).1 A judge of the Probate and Family Court allowed the defendants’ motion to dismiss, based on the plaintiff’s lack of standing. This appeal followed.

The case is controlled in material respects by Weaver v. Wood, 425 Mass, 270, 274-278, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998).2 As observed in Weaver v. Wood, “The Church is a public charity established by [Mary Baker G.] Eddy under a series of charitable trusts.” Id. at 274. Pursuant to G. L. c. 12, § 8, the Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the terms of charitable trusts.3 See id. at 275 (“the Legislature has determined that the Attorney General is responsible for ensuring that [a trust’s] charitable funds are used in accordance with the donor’s wishes”). Indeed, “it is the exclusive function of the Attorney General to correct abuses in the administration of a public charity by the institution of proper proceedings.” Id. at 276, quoting from Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass. 568, 573 (1926). As enforcement of charitable trust terms is the exclusive domain of the Attorney General, the plaintiff has “no enforceable legal interest in the administration of the charity, and [has] no standing to pursue such claims.” Weaver, supra at 278. Compare Krauthoff v. Attorney Gen., 240 Mass. 88, 92 (19210).4

For the forgoing reasons, as well as those expressed in the thorough memorandum or decision written by the Probate and Family Court judge, we affirm the judgment.

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1 The complaint also sought various other form of injunctive and declaratory relief. [RA 18-19]

2 We are aware that, unlike the present case, the Weaver plaintiffs also challenged actions undertaken by the Christian Science Publishing Society. See Weaver v. Wood, 425 Mass. at 271. However, this distinction is not material for purposes of ascertaining whether the plaintiff here has standing to pursue his claim. The defendants in Weaver included present and past directors of the Church’s board, and the court determined that the Church as a whole was a public charity. Id. at 274, 277. Its finding in this regard was not confined to the Christian Science Publishing Society, a particular arm thereof. To the extent that the plaintiff disputes the correctness of the holding in Weaver v. Wood, supra, the argument is not properly directed to this court. See Commonwealth v. Dube, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 485-486 (2003).

3 General Laws c. 12, § 8, inserted by St. 1979, c. 716, states: “The attorney general shall enforce the due application of funds given or appropriated to public charities within the Commonwealth and prevent breaches of trust in the administration thereof.”

4 To the extent that the plaintiff attempts to establish standing as the representative of Mary Baker Eddy herself, by means of a contractual obligation with the long-deceased founder of the Church, the argument seeks to enforce (whether in his own name or on Eddy’s behalf) arise under the same instruments addressed by the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court in Weaver v. Wood, supra, which established the exclusive authority of the Attorney General to enforce any rights or obligations arising thereunder.

The the three-member panel of the Appeals Court "affirmed" (rubber
stamped) the ruling of the Probate Court . . . that the Church is a
"charitable trust" so I have no standing to sue the Directors.

Only the Attorney General can monitor a charitable trust.

Rule 1:28 states that I can file a PETITION FOR REHEARING asking the
panel to consider my objections to their decision, and/or an
APPLICATION FOR APPELLATE REVIEW by five Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court of the Commonwealth.

In other words, the Appeals Court has thrown the ball back to me.

MAXIM: "Silence equals assent" . . . and the ball-game ends.

Or, I can throw the ball back to the court by objecting and stating
my reasons why.